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A DIALOGUE ON COMPARABLE WORTH. By Michael Evan Gold. 
Ithaca, N.Y.: ILR Press. 1983. Pp. vii, 111. Cloth, $14; paper, 
$7.50. 
A Dialogue on Comparable Worth is Michael Evan Gold's1 attempt 
to address the causes of pay inequities between men and women in the 
work force and examine the viability of the comparable worth theory 
as a remedy for the male-female earnings gap in America. The compa-
rable worth theory speaks to sex-related pay inequities across jobs 
which, although not identical, are deemed to be of equivalent value to 
the employer.2 The author frames the essay as a hypothetical debate 
featuring characters created from his imagination. The dramatis per-
sonae are a "moderator," who delineates the topics of discussion, and 
an "advocate" and "critic," who present plausible arguments on both 
sides of each issue. While this book presents no new approaches to 
equal employment opportunity thinking, it does offer a unique intro-
duction to the difficult dilemmas surrounding the theory of compara-
ble worth. 
The debate begins by examining various explanations for the clear 
1. Associate Professor, New York State School of Industrial Relations, Cornell University. 
2. The issue presented in this book is not whether the law should require equal pay for equal 
work (as it does, see note 8 infra), but whether it should mandate equal pay for "comparable" 
work. 
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earnings gap between men and women. 3 The advocate argues that the 
gap reflects sex discrimination in the labor market (pp. 3-4). The critic 
argues that the gap can be explained by legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
factors attributable to inherent differences in male and female job 
characteristics (pp. 7-9). These differences of opinion stem primarily 
from different basic assumptions about the operation of the labor mar-
ket and about the role of sex as a factor in labor market decision 
making. 
Both critic and advocate agree that occupational concentration or 
gender segregation4 accounts for much of the male-female earnings 
gap. For the critic, such compression flows from operation of the sex-
neutral human capital system: women willingly "select" lower-paying 
jobs by investing their time in job preparation inapplicable to higher-
paying employment (p. 8). The advocate, on the other hand, maintains 
that occupational segregation is invidious: women are socialized into 
pursuing certain types of stereotypically female jobs even though they 
might be qualified for and interested in higher-paying, stereotypically 
male lines of employment (p. 9). 
The advocate's and critic's differing positions on comparable worth 
reflect reliance on fundamentally different theories of labor economics. 
The critic's position derives from a neoclassical or perfect competition 
model of the labor market. He believes that labor supply and demand 
are the only factors which affect wage rates. Moreover, he concludes 
that discrimination cannot survive in the marketplace: "Some em-
ployers are certainly free of prejudice or greedy enough to ignore their 
prejudices. If other employers are discriminating against productive 
women, these unprejudiced or greedy employers will be able to hire 
women at bargain rates and, with this competitive advantage, drive 
their discriminatory competitors out of business" (p. 17). 5 Therefore, 
the critic reasons that the crowding of women into lower-paying jobs 
must be due to a lower average productivity of women or a lack of 
readiness for the more highly valued, higher-paying jobs (pp. 10, 17). 
The advocate adheres to a "segmented" labor market theory which 
suggests that women (and certain minority groups) compete for jobs in 
3. U.S. Census Bureau statistics for the last quarter of 1983 indicate that the average Ameri-
can female worker earned 66.2% as much as the average male worker. R. WILLIAMS & L. 
KEssLER, A CLOSER LooK AT CoMPARABLE WORTH 5-6 (1984). 
4. The advocate and critic use "segregation" and "concentration," respectively, to refer to 
the same phenomenon of women being crowded into lower-paying occupations. P. 14. The ad-
vocate believes such crowding is intentional, p. 6, while the critic asserts that it is unrelated to 
employers' behavior. Pp. 10-14. 
S. Although the critic does not raise the argument, this reasoning presumably extends to 
markets where discriminating employers hire women but only at a substantially lower wage than 
men. Nondiscriminating firms will ultimately hire away all women workers in the market by 
offering a higher wage. Equally, the nondiscriminators can run the discriminators out of the 
market by paying women a rate in between the market wage for men and the discriminators' 
wage for women. 
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a different sector of the labor market than men (p. 18). That is, be-
cause they lack information, women are generally trained for, and 
hired in, a sector of the labor market consisting of lower-paying, less 
valued jobs. Societal discrimination stops women from training for or 
gaining information about more highly valued jobs, and employment 
discrimination prevents them from crossing over into the primary la-
bor sector even when they have the requisite training (pp. 18-20). 
In addition, the advocate identifies certain benefits which employ-
ers can reap from discriminating. First, in situations where customers 
or male employees object to association with women employees, a firm 
might benefit economically by catering to those preferences and ex-
cluding women from its work force (p. 22). Second, some employers 
have a "taste for discrimination" (p. 22). 6 They are willing to sacrifice 
some profits for the privilege of not having to hire women. In particu-
lar, firms in the primary segment of the economy with high capital 
investments and high profits can afford to exercise such discrimination 
because their economies of scale prevent nondiscriminatory competi-
tors from driving them out of the market. 
Because women are occupationally segregated, the advocate be-
lieves that recognition of comparable worth is necessary to break the 
vicious social and economic circles which lock women out of higher-
paying, higher-prestige jobs. He cautions that current systems for 
evaluating job worth are biased against "women's jobs" (pp. 46-47), 
and argues for a job evaluation system which identifies key compensa-
ble factors so as to recognize the objective worth to an employer of 
women's as well as men's jobs. 7 
The critic objects to comparable worth on efficiency and laissez-
faire grounds. He argues that the assignment of worth under the job 
evaluation system distorts the value of that job as determined by the 
market equilibrium wage rate (pp. 43-45, 58-59). In addition, he is 
concerned that a nonmarket system of determining worth will inevita-
bly lead, as it has in other countries, to government intervention in the 
private sector, and will thus impinge upon laissez-faire capitalism (pp. 
62-63). 
Legally, whether current antidiscrimination laws recognize compa-
rable worth theory is an open question. The Equal Pay Act8 clearly 
rejects the concept of comparable worth, but there is a controversy 
over whether Title VII9 permits such claims. The critic argues that 
6. For a broader definition ofthis phrase, see G. BECKER, THE EcONOMICS OF DISCRIMINA· 
TION 5-9 (1957). 
7. Ideally, a panel of male and female employees would evaluate a priori the compensable 
components of each job. 
8. The Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982), proscribes unequal pay schemes 
for men and women only where men and women are performing the same jobs. 
9. The critic refers specifically, p. 7, to the Bennett Amendment (the second sentence of 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h), amending Title VII) which reads: 
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the legislative history of Title VII, and a pivotal Supreme Court case, 
County of Washington v. Gunther, 10 and its progeny foreclose a com-
parable worth cause of action. 11 
The advocate emphasizes that Gunther left open the comparable 
worth question. 12 He relies heavily on Briggs v. City of Madison 13 for 
the proposition that a plaintiff can construct a prima facie case of sex 
discrimination in compensation under Title VII using a comparable 
worth argument (p. 83).14 In Briggs, the plaintiffs lost only because 
the defendant-employer asserted a successful "labor market de-
fense." 15 The advocate suggests that "it will not be long before judges 
realize that the defense of the labor market is a false defense because 
the market discriminates against women" (p. 84). Once such a defense 
is eliminated, courts will grant relief to plaintiffs paid lower wages for 
comparable work regardless of the employer's reasons for 
discriminating. 
Gold's hypothetical debate format is effective both in framing the 
comparable worth issue in realistic terms and in highlighting strengths 
and weaknesses in the arguments for and against comparable worth. 
The form of the discussion in A Dialogue on Comparable Worth allows 
the reader to follow the logic of each argument to its natural conclu-
sion. Gold's unique style of addressing the issue should bring the 
reader to a more enlightened understanding of the comparable worth 
controversy. 
The one shortcoming of the book is that it omits some crucial ar-
guments undercutting the critic's position. The author makes his most 
striking omissions in the discussion of labor market operation. The 
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter for any employer to 
differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of the wages or compensation 
paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such differentiation is authorized by the 
provisions of section 206(d) of title 29. 
10. 452 U.S. 161 (1981). 
11. Pp. 70, 73-74. The critic argues that the cases which seem to accord Title VII protection 
to comparable worth claims in fact hinged on proof of an employer's intentional, sex-based wage 
discrimination. A comparable worth claim would only require the showing of a discriminatory 
impact. P. 79. 
12. Pp. 71-73. In Gunther, the Supreme Court held that the Bennett Amendment, see note 9 
supra, did not confine Title VIl's application to the requirements of the Equal Pay Act. The 
Court expressly stated that it was not ruling on the comparable worth question. "Respondents' 
claim is not based on the controversial concept of'comparable worth' .... Rather, respondents 
seek to prove, by direct evidence, that their wages were depressed because of intentional sex 
discrimination ..•• " Gunther, 452 U.S. at 166. 
13. 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 739 (W.D. Wis. 1982). 
14. The plaintiffs in Briggs - public health nurses (predominantly women)- were paid less 
than the sanitarians (all men). Plaintiffs were held to establish a prima facie case by showing that 
their jobs "involve work that is similar in skill, effort, and responsibility." 28 Fair Empl. Prac. 
Cas. (BNA) at 747-48. 
15. See 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 750. As one of several statutory exceptions to the 
requirement of equal pay for equal work, the Equal Pay Act exempts pay inequities due to any 
"factor other than sex." 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(l). 
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critic's theory that discriminatory employers are always forced out of 
the market16 is inapplicable to comparable worth. First, comparable 
worth deals with employers who hire women but discriminate against 
them in compensation. When unemployment exists, unemployed wo-
men who cannot find jobs with the "nondiscriminating" firms are 
forced to accept jobs with the discriminating employers. Thus, dis-
criminators qan still operate as efficiently as their competitors (even 
more so, because they are paying less for labor) and cannot be driven 
out of the market. Second, the model does not reach markets in which 
women are segregated, by all firms, into jobs with lower compensation 
than similar "men's jobs." 
Another important argument omitted by Gold is that a perfect 
competition theory ignores a significant externality: the law. The 
model insists that nondiscriminating firms can force discriminating 
firms out of business by hiring away productive female laborers at a 
wage higher than discriminators are willing to pay (if they are willing 
to pay at all) but lower than the market wage for men. In so doing, 
the "nondiscriminating" firms would be discriminating in compensa-
tion against women in violation of the law. If these firms choose to 
obey the law, they lose their efficiency advantage over the "discrimi-
nating" firms and are unable to force them from the market. If they 
break the law, they create further discrimination in the market. The 
predicted exit in the long run of the "more discriminating" firms never 
takes place because the law condemns both "more discriminating" 
firms and "less discriminating" firms equally. 
Finally, Gold's arguments against free market wage determination 
and the Equal Pay Act labor market defense are too cursory. While 
making the persuasive argument that reliance on labor market deter-
mination of wage rates compounds sex discrimination because the 
market reflects a biased view of women's work value, Gold understates 
this point. The most telling argument against a market solution to 
sex-based compensation discrimination is that discrimination has wo-
ven itself into the fabric of American society and the internal structure 
of the market economy. Therefore, only solutions which regulate or 
are external to the market can be effective in eliminating wage discrim-
ination against women. This book could have made a more substan-
tial contribution to comparable worth literature if Gold had examined 
the potential impact of such regulatory and external remedies on wage 
discrimination against women in the labor market. 
16. See note S supra and accompanying text. Some authorities argue that perfect competi-
tion simply does not exist and the model should not be employed in the discrimination context, 
See, e.g., R. WILLIAMS & L. KEssLER, supra note 3, at 43-45. 
